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Introduction 
For just over 20 years the story of Irish social partnership has attracted a wave of 
attention from academics and policy-makers all over the world (see Auer; 2000; 
Baccaro, 2002; Sabel; 1996). The fact that Ireland, with its historically 
antagonistic, fragmented Anglo-Saxon industrial relations (IR) system, was 
capable of maintaining such a distinctive, corporatist-style system of socio-
economic governance for so long fascinated and befuddled in equal measure. 
Throughout much of this period, too, the ‘Celtic Tiger’ economic success that 
accompanied the experiment in social partnership was the ‘poster child’ of the 
smart, modern economy. It seemed Ireland could have it all; astonishing growth 
in wealth creation and employment coupled with a socially-inclusive governance 
structure.  
 
The events of the past couple of years following the financial and social crisis 
that has gripped most of the Western world have brought the Irish social 
partnership juggernaut crashing to a halt. The country is presently in the grip of a 
deep economic recession. While international economic events have impacted 
almost everywhere, worries had long been expressed about the light regulation 
of financial institutions (domestic and otherwise) and an over-heated property 
market in Ireland.i The recent ‘bursting’ of national financial and housing bubbles, 
coupled with the government's 2008 decision (endorsed by the EU) to State 
guarantee all banking debt has meant that the crisis in Ireland is particularly 
severe. In this context, the social partners have, for the first time in two decades, 
 3 
been unable to negotiate a new national pact and the Irish IR system exists in a 
state of acute uncertainty and flux.  
 
This article begins by describing the core elements of social partnership, before 
going on to examine key factors involved in the demise of the Irish model and 
some of the broader implications that can be drawn. It should be noted, first, that 
the factors identified here did not emerge with the crisis, but these pre-existing 
weaknesses exacerbated the demise of social partnership once the extent of the 
crisis became apparent. Secondly, this article will characterise social partnership 
as a process borne of, and sustained by, extreme pragmatism; a pragmatism, 
indeed, that is characteristic both of the Irish IR tradition and political system. 
Where the impact of the crisis intersects with both of these points can be 
summed up, rather inelegantly, as the point at which the money ran out. 
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It couldn’t happen here 
Given the absence of many of the ‘institutional preconditions’ (Baccaro, 2002) for 
corporatist deals, and Ireland’s Anglo-Saxon IR tradition, much attention in the 
literature has been focused on ‘accounting’ for the Irish case (Roche, 2007). 
Analysis has focused on, for example, theories of ‘deliberative governance’ (O’ 
Donnell, 2000) and ‘competitive corporatism’ (Roche, 2007), and on an 
‘unorthodox system of institutional complementarities’ (Teague and Donaghy, 
2009). Other accounts, which echo critiques of ‘classical’ corporatism, see 
partnership as a form of union ‘incorporation’ (Allen, 2000) or have focused on 
the anti-democratic nature of the process whereby national policy-making is 
devolved to a select group of ‘insiders’ (Ó’ Cinnéide, 1998),.  
 
These various perspectives all contain important insights about the social 
partnership process. All accept that the process emerged as a response to the 
political, employment and economic crisis of the late 1980s. The trade union 
movement was suffering from sustained and serious losses in membership as 
unemployment rocketed.  The weak, minority Fianna Fáil (FF) government was a 
key driver behind the first social pact as that cross-class, ‘catch-all’ party, 
traditionally the State’s dominant political force, was desperate to shore up 
support amongst both business interests (by championing wage restraint and 
control of the public finances) and its middle and working-class base (through tax 
reform and continued social protection for vulnerable groups; Hamann and Kelly, 
2007: 981-984). Thus, it will be argued throughout that the partnership strategy 
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emerged as a pragmatic response by the social partners to a desperate situation: 
we will equally see how pragmatism informs a shift in the parties’ positions when 
crisis strikes again twenty years on.  
 
Secondly, virtually all accounts accept that social partnership became, over time, 
a very definite and distinctive process. Centralised bargaining was not new to 
Irish IR (Hardiman, 1988), but what distinguished social partnership after 1987 
was the all-encompassing nature of the social pacts, which gradually expanded 
to cover most areas of socio-economic policy-making, and integrated into the 
process ‘new’ social partners (civic, community and voluntary groups. As we will 
see below, however, it may be that, over time, the process became the point.  
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This time it really is different… 
Many comprehensive and erudite accounts of the Irish partnership process are 
readily available (see O’ Donnell, 2000; Roche, 2007). To review briefly, seven 
tripartite social pacts were concluded between 1987 and 2009: The Programme 
for National Recovery (PNR, 1987-1990); The Program for Social and Economic 
Progress (PESP, 1990-1993); The Program for Competitiveness and Work 
(PCW, 1993-1996); Partnership 2000 (P2000, 1996-2000); The Program for 
Prosperity and Fairness (PPF, 2000-2003); Sustaining Progress (SP, 2003-
2006); and Towards 2016 (T2016; agreed in 2006, the pay provisions were 
renewed in 2008. Other provisions were to run for 10 years, before the collapse 
of the process in 2009).  
 
The agreements have always centred on trade-offs between wage moderation, 
fiscal restraint and tax concessions. The agreements have also addressed other 
core labour market issues such as industrial peace, labour market flexibility, 
active labour market policy and social welfare reform. Table 1 summarises the 
main process from 1987-2009. 
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Table 1. Social Partnership in Ireland 1987-2009 
Agreement Context of 
negotiations 
Content 
1987-1990 PNR 
 
 
 
 
 
1990-1993 PESP 
1993-1996 PCW 
Fiscal crisis; 
unemployment;  
Thatcherite assault on 
unions in the UK 
 
 
EMU criteria to be met; 
jobless economic 
growth 
Pay moderation for tax 
concessions; 
industrial peace 
clauses 
 
 
Welfare reform; supply 
side policies 
1996-2000 P2000 
2000-2003 PPF 
Economic boom, full 
employment 
Introduction of 
community and 
voluntary pillar; 
promotion of 
workplace partnership 
2003-2006 SP (*pay 
renegotiated after 18 
months) 
Gloomy economic 
climate; slowing 
growth; some job 
losses 
Focus on ‘Special 
Initiatives’ 
(educational 
disadvantage, child 
poverty, housing etc) 
2006-2016 T2016 
(initial pay deal runs 
for 27 months) 
 
 
 
2008- pay deal 
(rejected by 
construction 
employers) 
 
2009- process 
collapses 
Return to economic 
health; concern about  
compliance with 
labour standards 
 
 
Emerging economic 
and banking crisis; 
fiscal crisis 
Longer (10 yr) ‘life-
cycle’ framework; 
measures to 
strengthen 
compliance with 
labour standards 
 
  
 
On the union side, negotiations have been conducted under the umbrella of the 
Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU). The ICTU is the only union confederation 
in Ireland, but acts to co-ordinate, rather than direct, the action of its affiliates, 
which retain significant autonomy. In 2008, there were 55 unions affiliated to the 
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ICTU, representing the vast majority of Irish trade union members.ii Irish trade 
unionism has been traditionally dominated by general unions and the Services, 
Industrial, Professional and Technical Union (SIPTU) now represents 
approximately 40 percent of the total membership of ICTU-affiliated unions. The 
acceptance or rejection of partnership deals is based on an overall vote of 
delegates from ICTU-affiliated unions. Within the ICTU, the powerful Public 
Services Committee (PSC) represents unions with members employed by the 
State and negotiates the specific public sector-related aspects of the partnership 
agreements. 
 
Irish employers have also been traditionally well-organised. The main employers’ 
association is the Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC), which 
represents around 7500 business organisations. There are also associations for 
certain sectors of industry, the most influential being the Construction Industry 
Federation (CIF). Leading officials of the IBEC have tended to be prominent in 
public affairs and represented on State bodies and the IBEC has led the 
negotiations of partnership deals on the employers’ side.iii 
 
From 1997, the partnership process expanded to address more ‘non-core’ labour 
market issues (e.g. social inclusion, drug-misuse, housing policy) and to include 
a wide spectrum of civil society groups, collectively termed the ‘Community and 
Voluntary Pillar’ (CVP). For example, civil society groups involved in negotiating 
T2016 included the Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed, The Disability 
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Federation of Ireland, The Carers Association and The Children’s Rights 
Alliance. This increasing range of elite community based policy-making was 
‘reflected in a dense web of working groups, committees and task forces’, which 
sought to ‘involve the social partners in the design, implementation and 
monitoring of public policy’ (O’Donnell and O’ Reardon 2000: 237-8). 
 
It is important to remember that the bargaining and implementation processes 
have always been voluntary, with unilateral withdrawal by any party possible at 
any time. Since the terms of the agreements were not legally binding unless 
passed into law by parliament, the Irish government was free to treat the 
agreements as advisory documents choosing which issues to fully implement, 
subject, of course, to industrial relations and political considerations.  
 
The events leading up to the collapse of the process in late 2009 arose in the 
context of a rapid deterioration in the public finances, a collapse in the housing 
market and construction sector and a liquidity crisis for the banking system.  The 
government and employers sought to renegotiate the wage agreement struck in 
2008 (O’ Kelly, 2010) but in March 2009, the government unilaterally introduced 
an emergency budget, introducing pay cuts for all public servants. Attempts to 
negotiate a new pact continued throughout 2009 and, in December, appeared to 
be on the verge of successful conclusion. However, a last minute revolt by 
government deputies over aspects of the deal relating to public sector reform led 
to the government withdrawing and the effective end of the Irish social 
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partnership process (ibid.). The December 2009 budget again cut public sector 
pay.  
 
In March 2010, with the partnership process moribund, the public sector unions 
and employers concluded a new four-year Public Service Agreement (the ‘Croke 
Park Agreement’),iv under which it was agreed to protect public sector pay levels 
in exchange for a reduction in employee numbers and a substantial commitment 
to ‘reform’, including the redesign of work processes. Despite considerable 
opposition to the deal amongst, and within, many unions (McDonagh and 
Dundon, 2010), the ICTU PSC ratified the deal in June. In November 2010, the 
Irish government accepted the terms of an International Monetary Fund-EU 
rescue package, outlined a four-year austerity plan, and, in the December 
budget, introduced €6 billion of tax increases, new charges and levies and 
severe welfare and public spending cuts (including a 12 percent cut to the 
minimum wage). 
 
The next sections will try and account for the inability of the social partners to 
conclude a social pact in the face of the recent crisis (as they were able to do in 
the dire circumstances of the 1980s). The focus will, first, be on issues relating to 
the primary actors (the State, the employers and the unions) and then shifts to 
the social partnership process. 
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Where did it all go wrong? The actors 
The State 
The origins of the Irish social partnership process are often traced back to the 
publication in 1986 of a highly influential report (A Strategy for Development 
1986-1990) by the tripartite advisory body, the National Economic and Social 
Council (NESC). As Hamann and Kelly (2007) note, the FF party appropriated 
much of the report in its successful 1987 election manifesto and, for all but a two-
year period in the mid-1990s, has remained in power until the present (from 1989 
on as the dominant coalition party). Social partnership became significantly 
associated with FF and, in particular, two men; Charles Haughey, Taoiseach 
(Prime Minister) from 1987-1992 and Bertie Ahern, Minister for Labour in 1987 
and Taoiseach from 1997- 2008. Under both men, the Department of the 
Taoiseach was significantly and progressively empowered and headed by 
successive Secretary-Generals who were closely associated with their political 
masters and were powerful and committed champions of the partnership process 
(Mac Sharry and White, 2001). A process that depends so much on individual 
personalities, though, is vulnerable when key players, as they inevitably will, exit 
the stage.  
 
Moreover, the fundamental and dominant role played by successive 
governments left the partnership process extremely susceptible to changing 
political winds. D’ Art and Tuner (2005) note that the role of the State in most 
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Western European countries with tripartite governance models has been neutral 
or supportive, aimed at persuading pragmatic employers to recognise and 
negotiate with trade unions. Once this has been achieved, and trust begins to 
develop between the parties, tripartite bargaining tends to involve some sort of 
devolution of policy-making to the social partners themselves. However, the Irish 
process has always been conducted in the ‘shadow of representative democracy’ 
(Donaghy, 2008: 58), whereby, ultimately, final decisions were taken by 
government, which retained its capacity to act unilaterally on what it considered 
electorally sensitive issues, irrespective of the interests of the social partners 
(Hardiman, 2006). In a political system such as exists in Ireland, with no ‘left-
right’ ideological divide, with a high degree of personalism in voting choice, 
where politicians are extremely responsive to localised concerns, and where 
power is very strongly centralised around the executive (O’ Malley, 2011), the 
process was, as a result, always open to a withdrawal of governmental support. 
Partnership, then, can be seen, from the governmental perspective, as a 
pragmatic political choice rather than an articulated and embedded ideology. 
 
The withdrawal of political support, when it came, was swift and brutal. The 
NESC report of March 2009 (Ireland’s Five-Part Crisis: An Integrated National 
Response) called for a national plan to address the banking and fiscal crises, but 
also the economic crisis of competitiveness and the social crisis of 
unemployment and income loss. The contrast with the reception of the 
celebrated report of 1986 could not have been starker, as the government 
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decided to effectively ignore the social partners and focus its attention almost 
exclusively on the banking, and latterly the fiscal, crises. Indeed, as McDonagh 
and Dundon (2010: 558) point out, ‘the abandonment of social partnership has, 
arguably, been central to the government’s strategy of dealing with the crisis’. 
Stimulus proposals agreed by the construction social partners, for example, were 
ignored, because, as one ICTU official put it, the ‘government was so busy with 
the banks it wouldn’t make any other decisions’ (author interview; August, 2010).  
 
Despite the longevity of the partnership process, the fundamental fact of the 
State’s driving role meant that at no time since 1987 did the social partners 
challenge the main tenets of government economic policy (Teague and Donaghy, 
2009a). Thus, unions did not seek to trade wage restraint for progressive 
redistribution policies, but instead for a reduced taxation burden on workers and 
institutional influence. Such a strategy worked well in times of growth, when tax 
reductions and moderate wage increases were possible, but once the crisis hit 
concessions were required. As unions and employers struggled to jointly respond 
to the economic downturn, the government quickly reverted to a unilateral 
approach of public service, spending and welfare cuts, and tax increases. When 
the money ran out, the dominant partner very quickly packed up the partnership 
tent.  
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The Employers 
While employers were initially somewhat reluctant to embrace tripartite 
bargaining in 1987, the main employer representative groups (led by the IBEC) 
have subsequently been key supporters of the process. Roche (2007: 421) has 
argued that the peculiar nature of Irish social partnership involved a refashioning 
of hierarchical control mechanisms (enforced, under ‘classical’ corporatist 
arrangements, by all-encompassing and hierarchically co-ordinated partner 
associations) so that the core participants were able, and prepared, to isolate 
groups of workers or employers whose activities were seen to be threatening the 
process. This was done through applying moral or social pressure on non-
compliant groups and through copper-fastening the role of the ‘older’ State 
institutions for IR conflict resolution, the Labour Relations Commission and 
Labour Court.  
 
However, it seems that the social partners have become increasingly unable 
(unwilling?) to ‘discipline’, in particular, recalcitrant employers. Writing a decade 
ago, Heery (2001: 315) noted that ‘while the official discourse of European 
industrial relations deploys the language of "partnership," there is evidence of 
European employers becoming less tolerant of unions than in the past’. Sheehan 
(2008: 106) has commented that the notion in Irish IR of the ‘good employer’, 
which engaged in collective bargaining with trade unions, abided by procedural 
agreements and respected the State’s dispute resolution agencies, has been 
fundamentally altered over the past two decades. We will look at the issue of 
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trade union bargaining rights in the next section, but there is a trend of growing 
antipathy towards unions by some major employers, which has included the 
victimisation of activists involved in union recognition campaigns (D'Art and 
Turner, 2005; O’Sullivan and Gunnigle, 2009). The voices of non-union 
employers, critical of social partnership, have become louder and more 
influential. 
 
There are a number of related points to be made here. Since the early 1980s, the 
State’s industrial development agencies have ‘marketed’ Ireland as non-union 
environment with the result that powerful, mainly US-based, multinational 
corporations (MNCs) have throughout the partnership era refused to engage with 
trade unions (a position ‘sanctioned’ by the Irish State) and have not been a party 
to partnership agreements. However, as Baccaro and Simoni (2007) note, social 
partnership ‘morally legitimated’ MNCs to ‘shadow’ the agreements and pay 
similar (moderate) wage increases as domestic companies, despite 
demonstrable differences in productivity gains. 
 
At the same time, the main organisation representing the collective voice of US 
companies located in Ireland- the American Chamber of Commerce Ireland- is 
known to wield considerable influence. This was demonstrated to staggering 
effect when the Irish government, prompted by the Chamber and large individual 
US MNCs, first opposed, and later succeeded in watering down, the EU’s 
Information and Consultation Directive (Doherty, 2008). One of the most 
 16 
contentious provisions of the transposing Irish legislation (the Employees 
(Provision of Information and Consultation) Act 2006) allows employers to 
comply with the law by ignoring or bypassing employee representative structures 
(union and non-union) and provides for direct information and consultation 
arrangements.  
 
Sheehan (2008: 112-118) has also noted an increasing tendency amongst 
powerful indigenous employers, which previously would have abided by the ‘rules 
of the game’, to refuse to engage with third-party dispute resolution bodies or to 
accept non-binding recommendations from the Labour Court. There have also 
been legal challenges to the State’s long-established system in sectors such as 
construction, retail and catering, where pay rates and other terms and conditions 
of employment are established by committees made up of worker and employer 
representatives (Meenan, 2009). Here, new, loose groupings of employers are 
challenging the representativeness of these bodies, as well as the 
constitutionality of the process on the grounds that only Parliament may set 
legally binding terms and conditions of employment. At the time of writing, the 
cases have not reached finality, but the legal challenges demonstrate the 
increasing fragmentation of employer interests.  
 
The argument is not that the social partnership has caused these changes in 
employer postures. However, undoubtedly political choices relating to trade union 
and worker representation rights (those discussed above and in the next section) 
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resulted in a lopsided form of partnership where co-operation at national level 
was never ‘underpinned by a code of rights to guarantee social partner 
engagement at the enterprise level’ (O’ Hagan 2002: 152). McDonagh and 
Dundon (2010: 556-7) note that it has been easy, given the minimal constraints 
placed on private sector employers by ‘the increasingly permissive nature’ of the 
Irish voluntarist system (underpinned, as we will see, by the partnership process 
itself), for employers to shift rapidly from discussions about the redistribution of 
economic gains to imposing concessions (via pay or job cuts, or changes to work 
practices) in the face of the current crisis. Over time, the benefits to employers of 
continuing to operate a partnership system, when set against the advantages 
observed to be obtained by those ‘outside the tent’, have become less obvious. 
This, of course, is a key tenet of the argument of the ‘incorporation’ theorists, 
who see the ultimate aim and outcome of a ‘partnership’ strategy as the 
demobilisation of union resistance to employer interests (Allen, 2000; Kelly, 
1998). 
 
The Unions 
Since 1987, the Irish trade union movement has pursued a strategy of 
exchanging wage moderation and industrial peace for policy and institutional 
influence (Teague and Donaghy, 2009). The extent to which unions did, in fact, 
secure institutional influence through the partnership process has provoked 
considerable debate. One the one hand, the unions can point to a considerable 
body of protective labour legislation agreed during partnership talks and then 
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progressed through the normal legislative process (Donaghy and Teague, 2007); 
for example on a national minimum wage, ‘exceptional’ collective redundancies 
and regulation of employment agencies.v However, it must be emphasised again 
that such measures ultimately require the imprimatur of the government before 
they become law. So, for example, the much-trumpeted package of legislative 
reforms on compliance with labour standards, agreed in 2006 in response to 
large-scale disputes involving the exploitation of migrant workers (Krings, 2009), 
has yet to pass into law. This follows a backlash against the measures by 
employer groups (Dobbins, 2008) and, in particular, small-medium sized 
businesses, which have been lobbying local politicians on the issue.   
 
It is the failure of the labour movement to extend its influence beyond the level of 
national talks, though, that has arguably dealt the biggest blow to union 
partnership advocates. Two principal approaches to strengthening unions’ 
workplace role were agreed through partnership. In the mid-1990s, the social 
partners outlined a voluntary framework promoting the diffusion of workplace 
partnership, based on the template of the national process. P2000 defined 
‘enterprise partnership’ and identified nine areas in which the concept would be 
particularly apposite.vi Despite the promotion of workplace partnership, the 
empirical evidence has shown that its incidence and significance, especially in 
the private sector, is limited (Geary, 2007; O’ Connell et al; 2010). This is not 
surprising. Whereas, traditionally, corporatist arrangements established a 
national framework of entitlements and obligations to guide how employers and 
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employees should behave at the workplace, social partnership in the Irish case 
did not display such interlocking connections between the national and local 
levels. The social pacts placed few constraints on private sector firms, in 
particular, granting them almost ‘complete autonomy to pursue corporate 
strategies of their choosing at the company level’ (Teague and Donaghey 2009: 
67).  
 
The unions, therefore, pushed for legislative change and a compromise solution 
was reached resulting in the enactment of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) 
Acts 2001-2004. Under the voluntarist model, there is no obligation on employers 
to recognise trade unions for collective bargaining purposes and collective 
agreements are generally not legally binding. The Acts allow trade union 
representatives the right to represent members, working for employers that do 
not recognise unions, on specific, identified workplace issues relating to pay, and 
terms and conditions of employment. The Labour Court can make a legally 
binding determination with regard to these matters, and to dispute resolution and 
disciplinary procedures, in the employment concerned but cannot provide for 
arrangements for ongoing collective bargaining (Doherty, 2009).  
 
While the unions had hoped to use this legislation as a ‘springboard’ to greater 
recognition rights, the legislation has been regarded as largely neutered following 
the decision of the Irish Supreme Court in Ryanair v The Labour Court.vii Here, 
the Court ruled that, under Irish law, employers should be free to determine the 
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form, structure and organisation of any internal ‘collective bargaining’ units (e.g. 
how their members would be elected or chosen, their remit, the terms of office of 
members, etc), as long as these have a degree of permanency and are not ad 
hoc. The Supreme Court also noted that it was ‘not in dispute that as a matter of 
law Ryanair is perfectly entitled not to deal with trade unions’ and went on the 
suggest that neither could a law be passed compelling it to do so.viii Irish (and, 
indeed, UK) unions had traditionally been suspicious of legal intervention in IR, 
fearing a hostile judiciary and the ceding of labour market regulation to legal 
professionals. Ironically, the partnership process has accelerated a rapid 
‘legalisation’ of employment relations; the Ryanair decision (much like recent 
experiences of unions before the European Court of Justice) has illustrated well 
the dangers of such a state of affairs (ibid.).  
 
Thus, 20 years of social partnership have not resulted in a strengthening of 
workplace organisation and the extent to which soidisant institutional influence 
has compensated for this is questionable. Over the partnership period, union 
density, and industrial action, levels have continued to decline (Walsh and Strobl, 
2009). It would be intemperate to draw a causal connection here, as these are 
problems that have been experienced by union movements all over the Western 
world. The difficulty for Irish unions is that, for a considerable period, social 
partnership has been viewed as ‘the only game in town’ (Donaghy and Teague, 
2007: 39). Given the centralised nature of the process and the no-strike clauses 
in the agreements, the breakdown of the process leaves a generation of union 
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representatives and activists with no experience of engaging in collective 
bargaining or taking collective action. Organisational weakness, of course, 
makes the unions considerably less attractive as a social partner. We will return 
to this point below in considering union responses to recent government actions.  
 
The Process 
Means and ends 
The Irish partnership model was distinguished by its all-encompassing nature; a 
broad range of actors addressing an array of policy issues. Those focusing on 
the ‘deliberative’ nature of the process have tended to emphasise its ‘problem-
solving’ approach to creating shared understandings and social consensus (O’ 
Donnell, 2000), a feature of the process manifested in the ‘increasingly elaborate 
institutional architecture’ of social partnership (Roche, 2007: 418). The process, 
too, placed considerable emphasis on producing procedural consensus between 
the key actors to guide the search for solutions to identified challenges (Teague, 
2001).  
 
However, a stabilised system that knows procedurally how to search for solutions 
does not necessarily produce functional outcomes; over time the ‘fit between 
agreements and economic context’, which may once have been intentional or 
serendipitous, can subsequently become ‘dysfunctional, all within broadly the 
same framework of negotiations’ (Hardiman, 2007; 5-6). There has been a 
 22 
question mark over the capacity of the partnership process to ‘deliver’, outside 
the core areas of pay, tax reform and industrial peace. In form, the agreements 
are akin to political manifestos; an introduction that lays out the approach and 
context, chapters or frameworks based on themes (tax reform, workplace 
relations, social inclusion, etc), and, throughout, numbered, specific actions or 
commitments. The first agreement (the PNR) was 32 pages in length; the latest 
(T2016) ran to 139 pages.  
 
What is striking is the number of commitments that pledge to submit an issue to 
‘review’, usually by means of establishing a working group or task force; 
Hardiman (2006) counts 65 working groups set up by the late 1990s looking at 
issues from pensions to childcare. Thus, a significant feature of the partnership 
process involved the avoidance and postponement of difficult or contentious 
decisions in favour of further deliberation. By 2003, it was tacitly acknowledged 
by the parties that very few concrete initiatives had emerged from the various 
task forces and their incidence was subsequently scaled back (Donaghey, 2008). 
Moreover, once the crisis struck, and fiscal difficulties meant the opportunities for 
review and compromise were circumscribed, the government ultimately took the 
‘hard’ decisions, settling little store by the views of partnership actors or 
institutions. It was quite happy to dismantle the institutional architecture. 
 
Furthermore, a focus on deliberation tends to obscure the fact that the role of the 
‘social pillar’ or CVP, has ultimately come to be seen as rather marginal to the 
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main business of social partnership, which centred on the State and the labour 
market actors.ix As Larragy (2006: 20) notes: 
 
‘The main bargaining chip the CVP has in social partnership is whether it 
rejects or signs off on a deal. But just how far it could "play it" depends on 
the political context - or what such a rejection might cost a government in 
popularity…the threatened rejection of Sustaining Progress in 2002 by a 
section of the Pillar resulted only in that section's expulsion from the 
partnership process’ (ibid: 20; emphasis added). 
 
When unemployment was a political priority in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
governments of the day were grateful for the legitimacy conferred by engaging 
with organisations representing the unemployed and other civil society 
associations (and, indeed, the unions); when the realpolitik was deemed to 
demand social welfare and public service cuts in the wake of the crisis, these 
organisations’ voice was quickly ignored.   
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The public sector, reform and resistance 
Given that trade union density is significantly higher amongst public servants, the 
public sector unions (in particular the State’s second-largest union, the Irish 
Municipal Public and Civil Trade Union-IMPACT) have always had a key role in 
shaping and sustaining the process. The literature on social partnership has 
tended to emphasise the pay benefits wrought for public sector workers by their 
unions (Baccaro and Simoni, 2007) in exchange for which the State received 
commitments on industrial relations stability (Donaghy and Teague, 2007). Much 
less attention, however, has been placed on the focus of the partnership 
agreements on public sector reform, particularly after 1997. 
 
According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD, 2008: 18), Ireland has ‘significantly advanced along a New Public 
Management (NPM) continuum’ of public sector reform which has explicitly 
sought the input of the social partners. An elaborate performance management 
system was devised, through partnership, for the public sector whereby the 
payment of agreed salary increases for public employees depends upon co-
operation with satisfactory local implementation of the modernisation agenda set 
out in national agreements.x Performance Verification Groups (PVGs) for 
different sectors (health, local government, etc) were established to make 
recommendations as to whether or not pay increases should be granted. In all 
cases, it was envisaged that the process of reform and implementation of 
change, outlined in the national agreements, would be accompanied by ‘robust’ 
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workplace partnership structures ‘characterised by high levels of employee and 
union involvement with management’ (NCPP, 2005: 30). However, Doherty and 
Erne (2010) have argued that, despite this democratic and inclusive rhetoric, 
public sector workplace partnership has been used in a managerialist manner to 
steer through a pre-determined reform agenda, which seeks tighter, more 
controlling management structures, constricts employee autonomy and which 
risks undermining the core public service ethos. This, again, suggests a version 
of ‘deliberative democracy’ that is largely instrumental; the use of partnership as 
a legitimisation tool (see Bacon and Samuel (2009: 245) for a similar discussion 
in the UK context).  
 
Ultimately, it was the issue of public sector reform that proved to be the final nail 
in the partnership coffin. As the crisis became more acute and the dire state of 
the public finances more apparent, the ICTU produced proposals for a national 
recovery plan. The union movement generally has accepted the need for a ‘fiscal 
adjustment’ aimed at reducing the exchequer deficit (see, particularly, the ICTU 
plan, A Better, Fairer Way),xi whilst arguing for a longer-time frame in which to 
make the adjustment, and a greater focus on job creation and protection for the 
lower-paid and welfare recipients than that proposed by government. In 
December 2009, it seemed the social partners had agreed a new national pact, 
which promised further extensive reforms of public sector work practices in return 
for no further pay reductions (O’ Kelly, 2010). At the core of the deal was a plan 
for 12 days’ unpaid leave for public sector workers. Although unpaid leave is a 
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fairly conventional way of addressing commercial difficulties in the private sector 
(akin to the recent policy of reducing working time in Germany and the 
Netherlands), the plan was denounced by many sections of the media as a ‘cave 
in’ to the public sector unions (Roche, 2010) and resulted in a ‘revolt’ by FF 
ministers and backbenchers unprepared to support the proposals (O’ Kelly, 2010: 
427).  
 
The episode showed up, yet again, the fault lines that had long been appearing 
in the partnership process. The government, once the political benefit of 
engaging the unions (and employers) in talks diminished, immediately and 
unilaterally exited the process. For the public sector unions, the reform process 
with which they engaged in recent years, and even the concession bargaining in 
which they engaged in 2008-09, was insufficient to keep the government at the 
partnership table, when the latter was confronted by the perceived demands of 
electoral pragmatism.  
 
It is submitted here that the crisis has laid bare a certain strategic disorientation 
on the part of the union movement. The leadership of the ICTU, SIPTU and 
IMPACT has demonstrated a tenacious determination to cling to the partnership 
model. The reliance of the union movement on a partnership strategy has 
seemingly, over time, engendered a reluctance to embrace (or a fear of?) 
alternatives. This has had a number of consequences. 
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First, the determination to negotiate a partnership pact has meant that, on a 
number of occasions, plans for co-ordinated industrial action have been 
postponed or cancelled in response to offers of fresh talks from the government 
and/or employer groups (McDonagh and Dundon, 2010). Most spectacularly, a 
planned one-day strike in late-November 2009 was postponed in order to allow 
the ill-fated ‘unpaid leave’ deal to be concluded. The ICTU leadership has 
managed, to date, to more or less maintain unity throughout the crisis. However, 
the strategy it has pursued has focused predominantly on negotiation and 
conciliation through the partnership process, has been dominated by pro-
partnership union leaders and has resulted in the frustration of a number of 
smaller unions, which favoured earlier and more prolonged campaigns of outright 
industrial action (for example, some of the teacher unions and the general, UK-
based union, Unite). Fears that the unions were not merely unwilling, but would 
be unable, to engage in strike action were, to an extent, borne out in early 2009 
when IMPACT failed to secure the two-thirds majority of votes required from its 
membership to partake in a planned (but, inevitably, postponed) national day of 
action.  
 
It would be inaccurate, however, to claim that the union movement has focused 
exclusively on a partnership strategy, as co-ordinated union action has taken 
place. Two ICTU-organised protest marches were held (on a Saturday in 
February and a Friday in November), which both attracted numbers close to 
100,000. Since early 2010, ‘low-level’ industrial action (mainly a work-to-rule and 
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overtime ban) has taken place in sectors of the public service. The strike weapon 
(with the exception of a one-day work stoppage by some 13,000 lower paid civil 
servants in early 2009), however, remained conspicuously unutilised until, after 
many false starts, around 250,000 public sector workers engaged in the country’s 
largest ever one-day strike in November 2009. However, as noted, a planned 
follow-up strike was postponed to allow partnership talks to re-commence.  
 
Thus, ‘traditional’ resistance strategies have been employed. However, in 
addition to being limited in scope and duration, these have featured, almost 
exclusively, public sector workers. Private sector workers, for example, were 
‘encouraged’ to attend the protest marches, but few seemed to be visible. A 
particularly damaging legacy for the unions from the breakdown of partnership 
has been the emergence of a perceived ‘divide’ between workers in the private 
and public sector workforces, which has dominated recent public discourse in 
Ireland. Some commentators, pointing to the fact that the general public 
perception of unions is largely positive (see Geary, 2007), focused on the role of 
the media in this regard. As Roche (2010) puts it: 
 
‘In the print media, in particular…it seemed that “open season” had been 
declared on social partnership and that it had effectively become tainted 
through its association with the nexus of failed institutions of the Celtic 
Tiger era… it would be reasonable to suggest that media commentary […] 
channelled and even seeded public disaffection with unions, public 
servants and social partnership’. 
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Furthermore, cracks are beginning to appear within the public sector union 
movement. Frustrated by what they see as a lack of ICTU action, a new, loose, 
alliance- the ‘24/7 Alliance’- of trade unions representing ‘frontline public 
servants’ (e.g. nurses, police, fire-fighters, and prison officers) has been formed 
to oppose government cutbacks and defend jobs and services. Thus, the 
relatively timid recourse to traditional union resistance strategies has served 
merely to exacerbate underlying schisms in the union movement and to underline 
the difficulties in mobilising a membership, which, recall, includes a significant 
‘partnership generation’ of members and activists that has never witnessed, 
much less participated in, industrial conflict. 
 
Moreover, the conclusion of the Croke Park deal has further served to deepen 
tensions within the union movement. The deal split the public sector unions with 
a significant number of unions voting to reject its terms. A striking illustration of 
this discord can be seen in the fact that one teachers’ union (the Irish National 
Teachers Organisation-INTO) voted in favour of the agreement, whilst two others 
(the Teachers Union of Ireland-TUI- and Association of Secondary School 
Teachers in Ireland-ASTI) voted against. Issues of trust, or, more accurately, the 
lack thereof, loomed large in the debate with both pro- and anti-agreement 
unions questioning the bone fides of the government. Some unions took the 
unprecedented step of questioning on the use by the ICTU of the majority vote, 
with the TUI arguing it would not feel bound by a majority vote to accept the 
Croke Park agreement, as the deal proposed work changes affecting specific 
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groups that are a minority of the whole (as teachers are within the wider public 
service).xii Ultimately, with the support of SIPTU and IMPACT, the deal was 
passed. By late 2010, most unions (including those who voted against it) had 
entered talks on implementation. However, many did so grudgingly. Unite, for 
example, said it would enter the public sector implementation process only to 
avoid ‘victimisation of its public sector members’.xiii It is likely that the 
agreement’s implementation process will provide many more flashpoints for the 
union movement, given the legacy of distrust from the collapse of the partnership 
process and as the precise details of concessions sought by management begin 
to emerge. 
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Conclusion 
The Irish trade union movement, after 20 years of partnership, finds itself at a 
crossroads. The legacy of that era seems to be, first, a more fragmented 
movement. This has revealed itself, damagingly, in the manner in which private 
and public sector workers have been ‘pitted’ against one another; most 
injuriously in terms of public perception. It will be difficult for the ICTU, in the 
medium-term at least, to maintain a unified public-private strategy, as it was able 
to do during the partnership years. Within the public sector union movement itself 
there has been fragmentation, with the formation of new, loosely-structured 
groupings and a questioning of the hitherto axiomatic use of the majority vote 
within Congress. The acquiescence to the NPM reform agenda by public sector 
unions and staff, copper-fastened by partnership agreements since the late 
1990s, the recent concessions granted under the Croke Park Agreement, and 
ongoing media- and public?-hostility to the public service may ultimately result in 
a less supportive State approach to public sector unionisation than has 
historically been the case. This would, from a union perspective, be a disastrous 
by-product of the collapse of partnership. 
 
In the private sector, unions also face steep challenges. Employer representative 
groups seem less able (or willing) to hold their constituency together in the face 
of challenges from increasingly vocal anti-union employers, seemingly 
emboldened by the failure of unions to strengthen their representation and 
bargaining rights. Attempts to secure such rights have backfired spectacularly, 
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with ‘workplace partnership’ largely non-existent and the legal environment 
extraordinarily hostile. In fact, it is possible that a constitutional amendment 
would be required to fully reverse the effects of jurisprudence in this area 
(including the Ryanair decision). The trade union movement is unlikely to relish 
campaigning for such a move given the damaging public association of the 
unions and social partnership with the policy and institutional calamities of the 
Celtic Tiger era.  
 
However, the case can also be made that the crisis presents an opportunity for a 
re-thinking and renewal of union strategies. Nascent strategies of resistance 
have begun to emerge. These are ‘traditional’, in the form of industrial action (the 
potential for which was so heavily circumscribed under partnership), but also 
‘new’, in the manner in which fresh union groupings are being formed, and, 
especially, the manner in which unions have begun linking and campaigning with 
other civil society groups outside of the social partnership structures under which 
the latter were so marginalised.xiv  
 
This article has argued that, ultimately, the Irish case can be categorised as one 
of ‘pragmatic partnership’. It seems unlikely that the partnership process as it 
developed since 1987 will be revived; the achievements of the partly self-
sustaining partnership ‘industry’ (of working groups, task forces and ‘insider’ 
networks) that emerged remain debatable. To some extent the process 
generated its own momentum; as long as the tune of economic growth and 
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employment creation was playing, the participants (whether music-lovers or not!) 
seemed unwilling to get off the dance-floor for fear of being left, lonely, at the 
margins. However, when the music stopped, the weakness of the ‘deliberative 
governance’ aspect of partnership was demonstrated. While deliberation and 
problem-solving became ingrained in the partnership process, ‘hard’ decision-
making and policy implementation remained centralised and, ultimately, subject 
to governmental whim. When the ‘perfect storm’ of a global economic crisis, a 
domestic banking meltdown and a rapid decline in prosperity hit in 2007, the 
partnership model, given its weak ideological foundations, proved unable to 
adapt and renew itself. The partners quickly (and brutally) brought an end to the 
affair.   
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i
 See, for example, the account of Ireland as a ‘financial Wild West’ in the New York Times, 1 
April 2005.  
ii
 See www.ictu.ie 
iii
  The employer groups party to T2016, in addition to IBEC, were the CIF, the Small Firms’ 
Association, the Irish Exporters’ Association, the Irish Tourist Industry Confederation and 
Chambers Ireland. 
iv
 Available at http://www.onegov.ie/eng/Publications/Public_Service_Agreement_2010_-
_20141.pdf 
v
 All of these are domestic, rather than EU-mandated, initiatives. 
vi
 Including, inter alia, co-operation with change and work re-organisation, and financial 
involvement; see paragraph 9.15 of Partnership 2000. 
vii
 [2007] IESC 6.  
viii
 This interpretation would seem to suggest that a legislative right to trade union recognition, 
such as exists, for example, in the UK, would be constitutionally prohibited. This appears to come 
perilously close to permitting the establishment of ‘company unions’; a unique situation in an ‘old’ 
EU Member State. 
ix
 Indeed, it seems that for most union members (and the public at large), support for the process 
has hinged almost exclusively on pay outcomes. Surveys of union members reveal little 
understanding of other policy aspects of the process, even where (in areas like childcare, 
housing, etc) these were issues that had a significant impact on working life (see, for example, 
Doherty, 2007). 
x
 See, for example, paragraph 27.18 of T2016. 
xi
 Available at www.ictu.ie/download/pdf/better_fairer_way.pdf 
xii
 Irish Times, 25 June 2010. 
xiii
 http://www.unitetheunion.org/regions/ireland.aspx. 
xiv
 See, for example, the Poor Can’t Pay campaign; http://www.thepoorcantpay.ie/. 
